



demands the greatest care and vigilance to navigate and this report serves as a reminder of the importance of a rigorous lookout procedure.

**PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS**

Information available included a report solely from the No 2 Hawk pilot, radar video recordings and comment from the appropriate operating authority.

The Board was briefed that a Y Series (LFS) NOTAM had been issued for LFA 4 located some 5nm to the E, but this warning referred to a para-gliding activity. The BGA Member suggested that during August, in the middle of the day, it is highly possible the reported ac was a motor glider on a cross country or a glider from a gliding site some distance away elsewhere. Such flights can roam far afield; however, when encountered at 500ft agl, especially in this terrain, it could be that it was a motor glider, or glider, executing a landing away from base, but it was an unusual height to encounter an unpowered ac. More probably at 500ft agl, it was a motor-glider or a microlight operating independently from local sites the Member added. It was unfortunate that the reported ac could not be traced and without the other pilot's account the Board could only assess this Airprox, rather unsatisfactorily, on the basis of the No2 Hawk pilot's report.

Whatever the other ac was, the No2 Hawk pilot saw it first from a range of ½nm, directly ahead. Certainly any ac is more difficult to see when approaching almost head-on, but white gliders with a small frontal cross-sectional area, possibly against a cloudscape, without any other additional aids such as HISLs to their improve their conspicuity, can be more challenging to spot. Nevertheless, the see-and-avoid principle appears to have worked as well as could be expected in these circumstances and, although the sighting range was not ideal, the other ac was seen in sufficient time to enable the No2 Hawk pilot to take effective avoiding action. Based on his account, the Hawk pilot was able to remain 200m clear of the other ac; moreover, the radar recording also evinced a climb in the vicinity. The Board could only conclude therefore, on the basis of the limited information available, that this Airprox was the result of a conflict in Class G airspace resolved by the No2 Hawk pilot and that the avoiding action taken was effective in ameliorating the Risk of a collision.

**PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CAUSE AND RISK**

Cause: Conflict in Class G airspace resolved by the No2 Hawk pilot.

Degree of Risk: C.